Showing posts with label Sonship. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sonship. Show all posts
Friday, October 7, 2016
The Johannine Use of Monogenēs Reconsidered by J. V. Dahms
I don't take a dogmatic stand on the controversy regarding the proper interpretation of monogenēs. There are days when I side with the traditional interpretation, and days when I side with the view of modern scholarly consensus. But there is a minority report among scholars for the traditional interpretation. Hence the link below to J.V. Dahms' paper The Johannine Use of Monogenēs Reconsidered. The displayed version at that link is illegible, but the downloaded version is legible. Once downloaded fix the file name extension from .pdf ' (with the apostrophe) to .pdf (without it). Then your default PDF viewer will be able to recognize it.
http://documentslide.com/documents/john-v-dahms-the-johannine-use-of-monogenes-reconsidered.html
Or download it from Scribd here. Or here.
See also Lee Irons' well known paper The Eternal Generation of the Son
I don't know how long J.V. Dahms' paper will be available at that link. So, I've copy and pasted the paper below. Keep in mind that pdf content doesn't copy and paste very well. The formatting will be terrible.
THE JOHANNINE USE OF MONOGENĒS
RECONSIDEREDJ. V. DahmsFrom New Testament Studies, Vol. 29, 1983, pp. 222-32Most modern scholars are convinced that monogenēs in John 1. 14, 18; 3. 16, 18; 1
John 4. 9, does not mean ‘only begotten’. As a result such modern English versions
such as RSV, NEB, NIV, GNB, present renderings like ‘only’ and ‘one and only’.
Extensive articles such as those by D. Moody, ‘God’s Only Son: The Translation of
John 3:16 in the Revised Standard Version’, Journal of Biblical Literature, lxxii, Dec.
1953, pp. 213-19; P. Winter, ΜΟΝΟΓΕΝΗΣ ΠΑΡΑ ΠΑΤΡΟΣ, Zeits. Rel.
Geistesgeschichte, 5 (1953), pp. 335-63; and Th. C. de Kruijf, ‘The Glory of the Only
Son (John 1:14)’, Studies in John Presented to Professor Dr. J. N. Sevenster, pp. 113-
23,1 support such renderings. Notable exceptions to the view include those of F.
Büchsel in TDNT, IV, 737-741, who holds that it ‘probably includes also begetting by
God’; and of B. Lindars, The Gospel of John, p. 96, who states that ‘“of the Father:
(1:14) . . . is decisive for “only begotten”’.
In this paper we re-examine the evidence and present what appears to be hitherto
unnoticed support for the view that in its Johannine use the word does include the idea
of generation. We begin with arguments which have been advanced by those who
hold the opposing position.
I
The first argument is etymological. It is stated that monogenēs is related to ginomai,
“to become”. Thus –genes means a “cagetory” or a “kind”, and monogenēs really
means “only one of its kind”.2 But derivation from ginomai could have another
implication (as well?). The root gen seems to be closely related to genn, the root ofgennaō, ‘to bring forth by birth’, so that the idea of derivation, even if not by birth,
may well be present. Of course, derivation of a person from parents is by birth, so that,
if a word from the root gen were used of a person to convey the idea of derivation it
would be implied that that person had been begotten. (Properly speaking, only a man
can beget; a woman bears a child. For practical reasons, and because nothing relevant
to our study hangs upon it, we are disregarding the distinction.)3 Moreover, there is
evidence that the root gen did convey the idea of derivation, at least sometimes, asgēgenēs, diogenēs, eugenēs and suggenēs show.4In this connection it is to be noted that J. H. Moulton and G. Milligan, The
Vocabulary of the New Testament, pp. 416-17, among others, state that ‘only
begotten’ would be monogennētos, not monogenēs. But, if the lexicon of Liddell,
Scott and Jones may be trusted, monogennētos does not occur.5 The possibility must
not be overlooked that it does not occur because monogenēs was commonly used with
the meaning that monogennētos would have had, if it had occurred. Moreover, even ifmonogennētos was used, this would not make the use of monogenēs with a more or
less synonymous meaning impossible.
Etymology provides no objection to the meaning ‘only begotten’; it may even
provide some support for it. But, of course, meaning is determined by usage, not by
etymology.
II
The meaning of monogenēs when not used of persons is sometimes set forth as an
argument.6 In Ps. 21 (22). 20 (21) LXX, ‘Deliver my soul from the sword, mymonogenē from the power of the dog’, and Ps. 34 (35). 17 LXX, ‘Deliver my soul
from their mischief, my monogenē from lions’, the meaning must be something like
‘my unique possession’ or ‘my specially valued possession’. When Parmenides, to
take an extra-biblical example, describes ‘being’ as unbegotten, incorruptible, whole
(not in parts), mounogenēs, and without end’,7 our word evidently means something
like ‘unique’. Further illustrations of a similar nature can be adduced.
But such evidence may not be decisive for the meaning when persons are being
described.
III
Arguments are frequently advanced to show that our term is sometimes used of
people, divine beings, etc., in such a way as to imply that the idea of derivation is not
present.
Various writers8 draw attention to Heb. 11. 17, ‘Abraham, when he was tested,
offered up Isaac, and he who had received the promises was ready to offer up ton
monogenē.’ They point out that Abraham had another son at the time, Ishmael, and,
on this ground, argue that monogenēs cannot mean ‘only begotten’, even when used
of people. They contend that the meaning must be that Isaac is called monogenēs to
signify that he was unique and/or beloved.9But the Targum of Pseudo-Jonathan contains what may be a hint that the argument
is invalid. Though Ishmael is referred to therein as a son of Abraham, according to the
Targum on Gen. 21, ‘In Izhak shall sons be called unto thee; and this son of the
handmaid shall not be genealogized after thee.’10 In addition, it may not be without
significance that the Targum on Gen. 22 describes Isaac as the son of Abraham’s wife,
whereas Ishmael is said to be the son of Sarah’s handmaid: ‘Izhak said, It is right that
I should inherit what is the father’s, because I am the son of Sarah his wife, and thou
art the son of Hagar the handmaid of my mother.’ (Cf. Gen. 21. 10.)
More to the point is a passage in Philo which discusses the sacrifice of Isaac, and is
evidently dependent on Gen. 22 in a Greek version11 which, unlike LXX, described
Isaac as monogenēs.12 According to de Abr., 194, ‘He (Abraham) had begotten no son
in the truest sense but Isaac (gnēsion te huion pepoiēmenos monon touton euthus
eiche). (Cf. de Sac., 43.) Other Philonic descriptions of Isaac to the effect that he was
Abraham’s ‘only and dearly cherished (agapētos kai monos) son’ (de Abr., 168; cf. de
Abr., 196; Quod Deus Imm., 4) suggest that monogenēs meant ‘beloved’, but make it
clear that it implied ‘only (child)’ as well.
Not only does the foregoing evidence indicate that the common argument based on
Heb. 11. 17 is unfounded, it indicates that monogenēs means ‘only’, if not ‘only
begotten’.
According to P. Winter, loc. Cit., p. 342, on one occasion ‘Josephus uses the term
in the sense of “favourite”, “best-beloved”, - so in Ant., XX.ii.1.22 where he records
that king Monobaz of Adiabene bestowed his parental affections upon his “only-
begotten son” Izates thus provoking the envy of Izates’ ‘brothers.’ But such an
understanding of the passage, found also in Whiston’s translation, is to be questioned.
L. H. Feldman in the Loeb edition of Josephus’ works translates, ‘It was clear that all
his favour was concentrated on Izates as if he were an only child (hōs eis monogenē).’
Surely Feldman’s translation represents what Josephus wrote, and renders Winter’s
argument invalid
Attention has been drawn to some passages, however, which are more
problematical:
1. Psalm 24 (25). 16 LXX, ‘Look upon me and have mercy upon me for I ammonogenēs and poor.’ We think it not impossible that the meaning ‘only child’, i.e.
one who has no sibling to provide help, is (also?) intended. (Cf. Gen. 4. 9; 38. 8; Lev.
21. 2; 25. 25, 48; Deut. 25. 5; 28. 54.) But perhaps such a description as ‘solitary’ or
‘lonely’ is intended.
2. Wisdom 7. 22, ‘In her (wisdom) there is a spirit that is intelligent, holy,monogenēs . . .’ In view of the dependence of Wisd. 7-8 on Prov. 8, it is entirely
possible that the idea of generation is included in this use of our term, since Prov. 8.
25 LXX speaks of the Lord begetting (gennai) wisdom.133. 1 Clem. 25. 2, ‘There is a bird which is called the Phoenix. This is monogenēs,
and lives 500 years.’ It is not impossible that the legend that there was only one
Phoenix at a time, and that it came forth from the ashes of its predecessor, made it
appropriate for it to be described as ‘only derived’. As we have seen, ‘only derived’ is
possibly the proper meaning of monogenēs, and ‘only begotten’ is the implication of
‘only derived’ when birth is in view.
4. R. Bultmann, The Gospel of John, pp. 71 ff. n. 2, points out that such ‘divinities’
as Hecate, Core, Persephone and Demeter are described as monogenēs. (Once only
Phanes, though probably in error for prōtogonos.) Demeter is of special interest for us
because she is described in Greek mythology as a daughter of Cronos and Rhea, who
are credited with such further offspring as Hestia, Hera, Hades, Poseidon and Zeus. It
is to be noted, however, that Bultmann thinks that the description of these divinities asmonogenēs is ‘probably on the basis of old tradition’, and one wonders whether it
may not be that it harks back to a period before the relationship of the various
divinities to one another was developed to the extent familiar to us. Perhaps there was
a time when each of the divinities was thought of as only begotten, though we must
admit that the idea of uniqueness is peculiarly appropriate to Demeter.145. In O. Kern, Orphicorum Fragmenta, 247, 23, the Biblical Moses is described asmounogenēs. The Pentateuchal record concerning Aaron and Miriam makes it clear
that ‘only begotten’ cannot be the meaning of our term in this instance.
The foregoing constitutes all the evidence we have found supporting the view thatmonogenēs, when used of persons, does not include the concept of generation. When
contrasted with what is to be said on the other side, the evidence is not very
impressive. It is certainly not impressive enough to be decisive concerning the
ordinary meaning of our term.
In addition to the evidence already adduced on the other side, there is the fact that,
during the controversy with the Arians and thereafter, monogenēs is represented as
including the idea of generation. Of a number of examples, perhaps the most notable
is Jerome’s Vulgate version of John 1. 14, 18; 3. 16, 18; 1 John 4. 9; Heb. 11. 17,
where our term is translated unigenitus.15It has been argued that it was at this time that it was first thought that monogenēsincludes the idea of generation.16 In support of this view it has been noted that the old
Latin Codex Vercellensis (a) has unicus as the translation of mongenēs, a practice to
which Jerome’s Vulgage conforms except in the Christologically significant passages
cited above. It has also been noted that the versions of the Apostles’ Creed found in
Augustine and the Sacramentum Gallicanum (A.D. 650) have unigenitus whereas
older and later versions have unicus in describing Christ. And it has been pointed out
that in the second credal statement at the end of Epiphanius’ Ancoratus (A.D. 374)
Christ is described as gennēthenta ek theou patros monogenē. That a form of gennaōas well as a form of monogenēs is thus used is said to be because monogenēs by itself
did not include the idea of generation.17It is perhaps to be expected that the orthodox would be eager to find the doctrine of
the generation of the Son in as many Scriptures as possible, even though the Arians
could speak of the divine Son as ‘begotten (gegennēmenon) before all ages’.18 But it
is difficult to believe that monogenēs could be newly understood to have or to include
this meaning under such circumstances. Many of the people concerned were welleducated and thoroughly familiar with Greek. The controversies in which they were
engaged involved them in consideration of the precise meaning of various terms,
including the one presently of interest to us.19 Such circumstances would be
unfavourable to the penetration of new meanings into these terms. Indeed, they would
militate against such a development. Moreover, one would have expected such
evidence of objection if someone had newly intimated that our term included the idea
of generation. I know of no such evidence.
On the other hand, given the nature of the Arian controversy, it is understandable
that the idea of generation, if implicit in our term, would be brought to the fore. This
would explain Jerome’s use of unigenitus in Christological passages of the New
Testament, if it be true that the Old Latin versions always rendered monogenēs byunicus, as was apparently the case with the Codex Vercellensis, which was
‘supposedly written in A.D. 365 by Eusebius, Bishop of Vercelli’.20 But that this
codex is typical of the Old Latin version(s) is questionable. When Hilary of Poitiers,On the Trinity (before 358),21 I, 10, quotes John 1. 1-14, he uses unigenitus. He does
likewise when quoting John 1. 18 in ibid., VI, 39, where he appends the comment,
‘He not only calls Him the Son, but adds the further designation of the Only-begotten
(unigenitum), and so cuts away the last prop from under this imaginary adoption. For
the fact is that He is Only-begotten (unigeniti) is proof positive of His right to the
name of Son.’ It is hardly conceivable that he could have made such a comment
without more ado unless his readers were familiar with unigenitus in their Latin New
Testaments. At a later point we shall quote a passage from Tertullian which raises the
question whether unigenitus did not occur in a (the) Latin version commonly used in
his day.
That unigenitus appears in the versions of the Apostle’s Creed found in the
writings of Augustine and in the Sacramentarium Gallicum and not in earlier Latin
Versions is easily explained as due to the influence of the Arian controversy. That the
final form of the Western Creed reads unicus is no doubt due to the power of tradition.
The widespread persistence of ‘trespasses’ in modern recitation of the Lord’s Prayer
among English-speaking people is somewhat comparable.
That an early credal statement should describe Christ as gennēthenta ek theou
patros monogenē is not necessarily because the idea of begetting was absent from the
meaning of monogenēs. Prōtotokon in eteken ton huion autēs ton prōtotokon (Luke 2.
7) includes the idea of bearing (a child) even though it is used with eteken in a way
more or less similar to the way in which monogenē is used with gennēthenta in the
phrase with which we are concerned.
But more important is the evidence, in addition to that found in Philo, thatmonogenēs was understood to include the idea of generation prior to the days of the
Arian debates:
1. When monogenēs is used of persons, the context usually makes it clear that the
descent of the person described by it is in view. Phrases like ‘monogenēs son’ (Luke 7.
12), and ‘I am the monogenēs of my father’ (Tob. 6. 14 .a), are common. (Cf. Tob. 6.
14. B, ‘I am the monos of my father.’22) Apart from the few references discussed
above, every occurrence of our term with respect to persons is in a context in which
the idea of descent is either implied or is appropriate. Such phrases as ‘monogenēsbrother’ are notably non-existent.
2. Tob. 8. 17, ‘Thou hast had compassion on two monogeneis.’ Tob. 3. 10-15 and 6.
14 make it clear that what is meant is that each of the two mentioned, namely Tobias
and Sarah, is an only child. But these verses are so far removed – 84 lines between 6.
14 and 8. 17 in Rahlfs’ edition of the Vaticanus text – that it is unlikely thatmonogenēs would be used absolutely, as it is in 8. 17, unless it was understood as
itself including the ‘child’ idea.
3. Justin, Dial. with Trypho, 105, quotes Ps. 22. 20 LXX, ‘Deliver my soul from
the sword, and my monogenē from the hand of the dog’, and insisting on a Messianic
prophecy therin, comments on monogenē: ‘I have already proved that he was themonogenēs of the Father in all things, being begotten in a peculiar manner Word and
Power by Him (idiōs ex autou logos kai dunamis gegennēmenos), and having
afterwards become man through the Virgin . . .’ Concerning this passage note (a)
Unless it is in monogenēs, there is nothing in the Psalm which intimates that what is
spoken of is a son, or is begotten of God; and (b) The conception of the begotten
‘Word’ is surely owed to the use of monogenēs of the Logos in John 1. (It may be
added that the reference to previous demonstration apparently looks back to chapters
61 and 62 in which Prov. 8. 22 ff. is interpreted as teaching the begetting of the Son
by the Father.)
4. Justin, Apol., I.23, ‘Jesus Christ is the only proper Son who has been begotten by
God (monos idiōs huios tō theō gegennētai), being His Word and first-begotten, and
Power; and becoming man according to His wil . . .’ This passage, with its reference
to the Son of God as the ‘Word’of God, is probably dependent on John 1. But, if so,
Justin understood monogenēs to mean ‘only begotten’.
5. Tertullian, Against Praxeas, vii, ‘By proceeding from Himself He became His
first-begotten Son, because begotten before all things; and unigenitus because alonegenitus of God.’ Besides the reminiscence of Johannine usage in unigenitus, the
context specifies that the ‘Word’ is being described, providing further evidence thatmonogenēs in John 1 is understood to mean unigenitus.
It seems clear that monogenēs, when used of persons, was always understood to
include the idea of generation. This understanding did not have its beginning at the
time of the Arian controversy.
IV
On the basis of the context of John 1. 14, 18, and of 1 John 4. 9, P. Winter loc. cit., p.
336, has argued that monogenēs in the Johannine writings must mean ‘unique’.
Of the former text he says, ‘Although Jn 1:14, 18 speaks of one who is monogenēsin relation to God, v. 12 does not exclude others from the possibility of “becoming
children of God”.’ He has overlooked the fact that ‘children’ in 1. 12 is tekna, and that
in the Johannine literature teknon is never used of Christ’s relation to God, just as
huios is never used of the relationship of Christians to God. Moreover, the term
‘Father’ occurs of God in 1. 14, and in a way which seems applicable only to the
divine Son in the Johannine usage. Those who are Christ’s are described as ‘children
of God’ (John 1. 12; 11. 52; 1 John 3. 1, 2, 10; 5. 2), as ‘born of God’ (John 1. 13; 1
John 3. 9; 4. 7; 5. 1, 4, 18), as ‘born of the Spirit’ (John 3. 5, 8), and as ‘of God’ (1
John 3. 10; 4. 4, 6; 3 John 11; cf. 1 John 4. 1, 2, 3). But ‘Father’, common as it is as a
designation of deity in these writings, never occurs in such contexts. The nearest to an
exception is in John 20. 17, ‘I am ascending to my Father and your Father, to my God
and your God’, but on this passage such a comment as the following is typical: ‘It
seems as though He is of set purpose placing Himself in a different relationship to the
Father from that which His followers occupy.’23 On the other hand Christ frequently
speaks of God as ‘my Father’ (John 5. 17-18 is especially instructive), and is often
described as the Son of ‘the Father’. (E.g. John 3. 35; 1 John 4. 14; 2 John 3.) We
suggest, therefore, that the para patros in John 1. 14 (contrast the para theou of John
the Baptist in John 1. 6) provides further reason to believe that Winter’s argument is
invalid.
Concerning the occurrence of our term in the Johannine epistle, Winter says, ‘After
1 Jn IV.9 has explicitly spoken of the hios (sic) tou theou ho monogenēs, V.1 goes on
to say: pas ho pisteuōn . . . ek tou theou gegennētai. No exclusiveness in number, but
a distinctive quality is here . . . indicated by the expression, µονογενής.’ Again he has
overlooked the fact that huios and teknon describe different relationships to God in
Johannine thinking. The use of huios in the former and of teknon in the immediate
context of the latter verse (i.e. in 5. 2) implies ‘a distinctive quality’ so that such need
not be implicit in monogenēs.
Winter’s arguments lose their cogency in light of the Johannine use of huios,teknon and patēr.
V
On the Basis of Heb. 11. 17, P. Winter, loc. cit., pp. 343 ff., and Th. C. de Kruijf, loc.
cit., pp. 113 ff., suggest that monogenēs may have been used absolutely of Isaac, and
that there may have developed the use of monogenēs and of monogenēs para patros(cf. John 1. 14), as a designation of Israel. John 1. 14, 18, are therefore to be
understood as containing an allusion to the understanding of Israel as God’smonogenēs. Evidence is drawn from Pss. Sol. 18. 4 and 4 Ezra 6. 58 to show that
Israel was so described. Note is also taken of the evidence in Philo, De Mutatione
Nominum, 81, that Israel was known as the God-seer, and therefore as the one who
makes Him known. It is suggested that there is an allusion to this in John 1. 18, ‘No
one has ever seen God; the monogenēs Son (or ‘God’) . . . he has made him known.’
Of course, if such is the case, the application of our term to Christ would hardly imply
derivation in anything like the sense of offspring from a parent.
Winter is correct in suggesting that monogenēs in John 1. 14, 18, may owe
something to the view that Isaac was known as Abraham’s monogenēs. He is quite
incorrect, however, in seeing Christ as somehow identified with, or the counterpart to,
the nation of Israel in the Prologue of John. In John 1. 14-18 Christ is clearly
contrasted with the leader of Israel in the time of the Exodus, not with the nation of
Israel. Moreover, it is not the nation of Israel as the God-seer which is in view, as
Winter believes, but Moses as the God-seer, or at least as the one who sought to see
God. As A. T. Hanson has pointed out, ‘The law was given through Moses, grace and
truth came through Jesus Christ’ (John 1. 17), is immediately followed by ‘No man
has ever seen God . . .’, and so reflects Ex. 33. 12-34. 9, a passage in which ‘the
giving of the law is associated with a man (Moses) seeing God.’24 Moreover, he
observes (1) that in this Exodus passage Moses is promised that God will cause His
‘goodness’ (33. 19) and His ‘glory’ (33. 22) to pass by, both words being rendereddoxa in the LXX (cf. John 1. 14); and (2) that plērēs chariots kai alētheias in John 1.
14 is a ‘more literal translation’ of rabh chesedh we’emeth than we have in Ex. 34. 5-
6 LXX, ‘And kyrios passed by before his face and called, Kyrios the merciful and
compassionate God, long-suffering and full of mercy and true (polueleos kai
alēthinos).’25There can be no objection to the idea that descent is implied in monogenēs on the
basis that Israel was known as God’s monogenēs, because such a designation for
Israel is not reflected in John 1. 14-18.
VI
We have shown that the view that monogenēs in the Johannine literature does not
mean ‘only begotten’ has very little to be said in its favour. In discussing the
arguments advanced to support that view, we have brought forth strong reasons
favouring the other side. We now proceed to draw attention to a further consideration
supportive of our thesis.
Each time monogenēs is used in John and 1 John it is in a context in which it is
preceded by a prominent occurrence or occurrences of gennaō in reference to the
‘spiritual birth’ of men. (See John 1. 13-18; 3. 3-18; 1 John 4. 7-9.) That it follows
such a use of gennaō in John 1. 13 is noted by M. Dods in The Expositor’s Greek New
Testament, I, 690. He comments, ‘The expression is no doubt suggested by the
immediately preceding statement that as many as received Christ were born of God.
The glory of the Incarnate Logos, however, is unique, that of an only begotten.’ What
seems not to have been noted hitherto is that the other occurrences of our term support
the judgement that the term gennaō suggested the use of monogenēs and thatmonogenēs therefore means ‘only begotten’.
But not only does Dods have the support of the other Johannine passages in which
our term is found. He has the support of 1 John 5. 18, ‘We know that anyonegegennēmenos of God does not sin, but he who is gennētheis of God keeps him.’ Here
reference to the ‘spiritual birth’ of men is followed by reference to Christ as born of
God. The parallel with the passages in which monogenēs is found is evident, except
that this time a form of gennaō is used instead of monogenēs! (The distinction
between the two kinds of sonship is preserved in that the perfect participle is used of
men, the aorist participle of Christ.)
D. Moody, loc. cit., p. 219, disputes the rendering of 1 John 5. 18 given above, and
argues that we should read ‘any one born of God keeps himself’.
The problem is a textual one, the question being whether we should read ‘keeps
him (auton)’ or ‘keeps himself (hauton or heauton)’. The codices aACKPΨ and
numerous other witnesses, including some early versions, read heauton. In support of
this reading Moody asserts that the idea of ‘keeping (tērei) oneself’ is repeated in 1
John 5. 21, ‘keep (phulaxate) yourselves from idols’. (John 17. 12 shows that tēreōand phulassō can be used synonymously.) But to say that we have ‘the repetition of
the same idea’ in 5. 21 as in our clause in 5. 18 is to be unaware of the difference in
meaning when a verb is used absolutely from when it is not. It is also to be noted that
the concept of ‘keeping oneself’ in the absolute sense does not occur elsewhere in the
New Testament.
Though the unambiguous reading of auton is not well-attested, it is found in a
number of minuscules, and is supported by the Old Latin, the Vulgate, and some other
versions. Moreover, it is probable that the codices A* and B, which could be read as
either auton or hauton, should be read auton, since hauton had become relatively
uncommon by the first century A.D.26 (But see John 2. 24.) Even more important: (1)
The change from the perfect participle ho gegennēmenos in the first part of the verse
to the aorist participle ho gennētheis in the second is strange if reference is being
made to the same person; (2) Elsewhere John always uses γεγεννηµένος, never γεννηθείς of the believer’;27 and (3) There is a close parallel in John 17. 12, ‘I kept
(etēroun) them in thy name which thou has given me; I have guarded (ephulaxa)
them.’ (Cf. Rev. 3. 10.)28 It may be noted that the United Bible Societies Greek New
Testament, Third Edition, and most, if not all, of the recent translations into English
accept the reading auton. (Cf. RSV, NASB, NEB, JB, NIV, GNB.)
In connection with his argument Moody states that gennaō is used in Ps. 2 LXX
with reference to a ‘coronation idea, not a conception idea’. But there seems to be no
evidence that Ps. 2 influenced the Johannine Gospel or Epistles.29 On the other hand
Prov. 8 is significant for this literature. Indeed, it is especially significant for the
Prologue of John where mongenēs occurs twice. Though it is likely that its occurrence
with respect to Isaac had much to do with the description of the Logos as monogenēsin this passage and elsewhere in our literature, it is probable that Prov. 8. 25 LXX was
also influential. (It is there stated that God begets [gennai] Wisdom. Moreover, the
origin, not the coronation of Wisdom, is clearly in view.) What we have said of 1
John 5. 18 strengthens this probability and is strengthened by it.
We have examined all of the evidence which has come to our attention concerning
the meaning of monogenēs in the Johannine writings and have found that the majority
view of modern scholarship has very little to support it. On the other hand, the
external evidence, especially that from Philo, Justin, Tertullian, and the internal
evidence from the context of its occurrences, makes clear that ‘only begotten’ is the
most accurate translation after all.
NOTES1 See also R. Bultmann, The Gospel of John, pp. 71 ff. n. 2.2 E. A. Nida, Good News for Everyone, p. 64.3 D. Moody, loc. cit., p. 217, seems to overlook the fact that gennaō can have a female as well as a
male for its subject.4 Cf. F. Büchsel in TDNT, IV, 737-738.5 So also B. F. Westcott, The Epistles of St. John, Fourth Edition, p. 171 n. 2.6 E.g. D. Moody, loc. cit., pp. 217, 219.7 Qu. By Büchsel in TDNT, IV, 738 n. 5.8 E.g. D. Moody, loc. cit., p. 217; E. A. Nida, op. cit., p. 64; L. Morris, The Gospel according to
John, p. 105.9 See P. Winter, loc. cit., pp. 338 ff., re ‘beloved’ as a translation of monogenēs.10 Trans. by J. W. Etheridge.11 Philo used the Old Testament in a Greek translation. Cf. O. Zöckler in The New Schaff-Herzog
Encyclopaedia of Religious Knowledge, IX, 41.12 For the rather considerable evidence of such a text, see P. Winter, loc. cit., pp. 337-8.13 This assumes with U. Wilckens in TDNT, VII, 500 n. 219, that ‘σοφία is expressly defined asπνεύµα in Wis. 7:22 f.’ Cf. W. Bieder in TDNT, VI, 371 n. 188.14 R. Bultmann, loc. cit., states that any influence of this usage on the Fourth Gospel could only be
‘very indirectly, if there is a connection between it and the use of µονογ. as a cosmological attribute’.
Bultmann’s judgment is especially significant in view of the fact that he is prone to derive Johannine
concepts and usages from Hellenistic sources.
15 Jerome’s revision of the New Testament was commissioned probably in 382. For evidence from
this period that monogenēs means ‘only (begotten?)’ and not merely ‘unique’ and/or ‘beloved’, see
Athanasius, Four Discourses Against the Arians, II.xxi.62; Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius, II, 7;
II, 8; Cyril of Jerusalem, Lecture XI, 2.16 B. F. Westcott, op. cit., p. 171; D. Moody, loc. cit., pp. 214-16.17 See D. Moody, loc. cit., pp. 214-15.18 ‘The Private Creed of Arius’ qu. In P. Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, II, 28; see also Gregory
of Nyssa, Against Eunomius, II, 7.19 See n. 14.20 D. Moody, loc. cit., p. 214.21 F. Loofs in The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopaedia of Religious Knowledge, V, 283.22 Because of Tob. 6. 14 B we doubt that B. Lindars, op. cit., p. 96, is correct when he states thatpara patros in John 1. 14 is decisive for ‘only begotten’.23 L. Morris, op. cit., p. 842. But see C. F. D. Moule, The Phenomenon of the New Testament, p. 110.24 Jesus Christ in the Old Testament, p. 110.25 Ibid., pp. 110-11.26 Cf. Blass and Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of the New Testament, p. 35; A. T. Robertson, A
Greek Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research, p. 226.27B. M. Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament, p. 719. The strength of this
point may be diluted by the fact that in John 1. 13 (most witnesses) the aorist indicative passive is used
of the believer. Ibid. states that A* and B support the reading auton.28 See D. M. Scholer in Current Issues in Biblical and Patristic Interpretation (Edited by G. F.
Hawthorne), p. 245 n. 72, for a fuller discussion of this matter.29 That Christ is called the ‘Son of God’ could be derived from 2 Sam. 7. 14. Cf. 1 En. 105. 2; 4 Ezra
7. 28 f.; 13. 52; 14. 9. John 20. 29 is reminiscent of Ps. 2. 12 LXX but it is doubtful that it is dependent
thereon. (Cf. C. K. Barrrett, The Gospel according to John, p. 477). C. H. Dodd, The Interpretation of
the Fourth Gospel, p. 271, suggests that the use of gennaō in John 1. 13 may owe something to Jewish
interpretation of Ps. 2. 7 as referring to the true Israel. (Cf. W. F. Howard, Christianity according to St.
John, p. 198.) In our opinion the fact that the tekna of God are being described, whereas Ps. 2 speaks of
the huios of God, a term our author reserves for Christ, tells against any conscious dependence on Ps. 2.
Sunday, May 18, 2014
Jesus the True and Proper SON of God
This blogpost should be read in conjunction with my blogpost: The Meaning of the Term "Son of Man"
[[[UPDATE: My views on the meaning of "Son of God" have changed. I think the following argument might be true in reference to Jesus' being called Son of God in the Gospel of John (cf. John 19:7). Especially if the traditional understanding of monogenēs is true. However, in the Synoptics, "Son of God" might sometimes refer to the aspect of His human messiahship, just as Jewish kings were termed "sons" of God. See also Bart Ehrman's book How Jesus Became God: The Exaltation of a Jewish Preacher from Galilee on how the term "son(s) of God" was used by non-Jews. Though, I do still think the term "Son of Man" does teach Jesus' deity, as I argued HERE.]]]
In this blogpost I argue that unless Jesus is fully God, then Jesus cannot truly be God's Son.
In Jewish understanding being the "son" of someone or some thing is to possess the same nature as that thing or person. This understanding and concept that kind begets kind and like begets like in the Jewish mind finds its partial yet primary origin in Genesis chapter one where each species produces offspring with its own nature.
Notice the Old Testament phrase "sons of the prophets" (e.g. 1 Kings 20:35; 2 Kings 2:3, 5, 7, 15; 4:1, 38; 5:22; 6:1; 9:1). It meant that such persons were considered to be prophets themselves. To be called a "son of man" in the Old Testament meant to be a man (i.e. a human being). Only after the revelation of Dan. 7:13ff. did the term "son of man" take on a new secondary eschatological meaning (as I explained in the comments of ANOTHER BLOGPOST where "Son of Man" applied to Christ actually implies Christ's full divinity).
It might be pointed out that the Old Testament also makes statements that contradict the above point. For example, it is true that in the Old Testament angels in general (or a specific loftier species of angels) are called "sons of God" without them being the actual sons and offspring of God by nature (i.e. possessing the same nature as Almighty God). It is also true that Israelite kings are sometimes called the sons of God. Even Luke refers to Adam as a son of God (Luke 3:38). However, it was an understood given that neither angels nor humans are sons of God by nature. But this is unlike many of the descriptions of Jesus in the New Testament. Not in every context, but in many contexts the New Testament over and over and repeatedly implies the true sonship of Christ. That when "sonship" is connected with Christ it is because Jesus is the true offspring of God the Father.
This is why the Jews were often offended by Christ's claim to be God's Son. This is also why many translations capitalize the word "son" as "Son" in reference to Christ. Because the translators understand that Jesus is the "son of God" in an unique and special way like no other. Notice how the Jews interpreted Jesus' claim to being God's Son as blasphemy.
I address John 5:18 in fuller depth in another blogpost:
This is also why the author of the book of Hebrews goes out of his way to distinguish Jesus from the angels and to deny Jesus' being an angel. Notice the CONTRASTS being made by the author when he compares the Sonship of Christ with the nature or status of angels.
I could discuss the places in the New Testament where Jesus is referred to as "the only begotten" to argue for Christ being the true offspring of God the Father. However, the meaning of the underlying Greek word "monogenes" is disputed by Greek scholars. Some interpret it to mean something like "only" or "unique" rather than the traditional understanding of "only begotten." Nevertheless, what I've written so far in this blogpost should be enough to demonstrate, at the very least, that Jesus is God's Son in a unique way.
But is Jesus really and truly Almighty God's offspring? If so, wouldn't that actually undermine the doctrine of the Trinity and the full deity of Christ? This is the conclusion of many non-Trinitarians. They argue that in human experience offspring have existence in a point in time after the existence of their parents. Therefore, (as Arius of old inferred) there was a time when Christ was not (i.e. didn't exist). By this point in this blogpost's exploration of the nature of God and of Christ we necessarily must deal with various options and alternatives. Where we have to admit (even if not explore) the distinctions between Arianism, Semi-Arianism, Nicene Monarchism and the various Trinitarian positions. Also, issues regarding the eternal generation or filiation of the Son, and the eternal procession or spiration of the Holy Spirit, the nature of the incarnation et cetera and whether such concepts are true.
For myself, I'm convinced of some sort of Trinitarianism or possibly Nicene Monarchism. There are various (sometimes conflicting) ways Trinitarians explain the doctrine of the Trinity. Some are more appealing to me than others.
As I continue studying the early church on the Christological controversies I've found many of the comments by (non-Trinitarian) David Waltz informative. He holds to what he has termed Nicene Monarchism and I find it appealing. Though, for the meantime I remain a Trinitarian. I do so while admitting the open secret that there are various types of Trinitarianisms (even among Evangelicals).
As David Waltz put it:
I argued for Option #2 in another blogpost. It was Argument Two at that blogpost. I've reproduced the argument below.
Argument Two
- Some Trinitarians like Jonathan Edwards have argued that God's eternal self-knowledge is so clear, so intense, so glorious and infinite that His mental self-conception or idea of Himself literally conceives, eternally, the person of the Son. Analogously, as a mirror reflects the one standing in front of it, so God's mental self-reflection eternally begets a second divine person, viz. the Son of God. Might it be that God's self-imagination is the Son who Scripture repeatedly states is the image of the invisible God? Furthermore, the love between the Father and the Son, the two divine persons, is itself so intense, so glorious and infinite that that love also eternally produces a third divine person, namely the Holy Spirit. And so, we have here a possible explanation of the eternal generation (or filiation) of the Son, along with the eternal procession (or spiration) of the Holy Spirit as historically understood by Trinitarians. And one that especially makes sense if the filioque clause is factored in. Since the Holy Spirit would proceed from the Father and the Son or the Father through the Son. This explanation would entail that each person of the Trinity is eternal (since the Father never began to have self-knowledge nor ever began to love that self-knowledge), while at the same time explain how the person of the Son is dependent on the person of the Father for His existence, along with the Holy Spirit depending on the Father and the Son for His existence (as the New Testament seems to imply). Yet, all three persons would be truly and fully God without subordination of ontology, even if there might be functional/complementarian subordination among the persons.
This argument is essentially that of Jonathan Edwards in his, An Unpublished Essay on the Trinity. Jonathan Edwards' argument may be an adaptation and modification of traditional arguments he inherited from the past history of Christian theology and philosophy (e.g. from Thomas Aquinas).
As an avid follower of Edwards, John Piper argues this in the first chapter of his book The Pleasures of God: Meditations on God's Delight in Being God. I believe (rightly or wrongly) that that first chapter has been posted online HERE.
Piper also explored this idea in a sermon he gave years before the publication of his book. The sermon is, The Pleasure of God In His Son (preached Jan. 25, 1987).
Piper states it this way in his sermon:
Thomas Aquinas argues similarly (though not exactly) in his Summa Theologica, Part 1, Treatise on The Most Holy Trinity, Question 27 (or look it up Here)
Consider what Tertullian wrote:
And that you may the more readily understand this, consider first of all, from your own self, who are made “in the image and likeness of God,” for what purpose it is that you also possess reason in yourself, who are a rational creature, as being not only made by a rational Artificer, but actually animated out of His substance. Observe, then, that when you are silently conversing with yourself, this very process is carried on within you by your reason, which meets you with a word at every movement of your thought, at every impulse of your conception. Whatever you think, there is a word; whatever you conceive, there is reason. You must needs speak it in your mind; and while you are speaking, you admit speech as an interlocutor with you, involved in which there is this very reason, whereby, while in thought you are holding converse with your word, you are (by reciprocal action) producing thought by means of that converse with your word. Thus, in a certain sense, the word is a second person within you, through which in thinking you utter speech, and through which also, (by reciprocity of process,) in uttering speech you generate thought. The word is itself a different thing from yourself. Now how much more fully is all this transacted in God, whose image and likeness even you are regarded as being, inasmuch as He has reason within Himself even while He is silent, and involved in that Reason His Word! I may therefore without rashness first lay this down (as a fixed principle) that even then before the creation of the universe God was not alone, since He had within Himself both Reason, and, inherent in Reason, His Word, which He made second to Himself by agitating it within Himself. - Tertullian in Against Praxeas [trans. by Dr. Holmes]
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf03.v.ix.v.html
The two arguments above (#1 & #2) [referring to the other blogpost from which I've copied and pasted this. So, argument #1 isn't in this blogpost] could be seen as contradictory. Since, the first argument implies that a divine person can't exist apart from at least one other divine person. The second argument implies that the others (i.e. Son and Spirit) can't exist apart from the Father.
That's why I wrote, "If one doesn't like that argument, here's another...." Nevertheless, I don't think they are necessarily contradictory. Also, they are two different types of arguments. The first part of Argument One is a hypothetical thought experiment. The second part is pure speculation. As a whole, the first argument is an argument based on natural theology. That is, on what can be gleaned and inferred from general revelation using reason. While Argument Two attempts to explain Trinitarian theology by freely using Biblical data and so appeals to and depends on special revelation. The first argument moves from the many to the one. The second argument moves from the one to the many.
Here's a link to J.C. Philpot's classic work: The True, Proper, and Eternal Sonship of the Lord Jesus Christ The Only Begotten Son of God
[[[UPDATE: My views on the meaning of "Son of God" have changed. I think the following argument might be true in reference to Jesus' being called Son of God in the Gospel of John (cf. John 19:7). Especially if the traditional understanding of monogenēs is true. However, in the Synoptics, "Son of God" might sometimes refer to the aspect of His human messiahship, just as Jewish kings were termed "sons" of God. See also Bart Ehrman's book How Jesus Became God: The Exaltation of a Jewish Preacher from Galilee on how the term "son(s) of God" was used by non-Jews. Though, I do still think the term "Son of Man" does teach Jesus' deity, as I argued HERE.]]]
In this blogpost I argue that unless Jesus is fully God, then Jesus cannot truly be God's Son.
In Jewish understanding being the "son" of someone or some thing is to possess the same nature as that thing or person. This understanding and concept that kind begets kind and like begets like in the Jewish mind finds its partial yet primary origin in Genesis chapter one where each species produces offspring with its own nature.
11 And God said, "Let the earth sprout vegetation, plants yielding seed, and fruit trees bearing fruit in which is their seed, each according to its kind, on the earth." And it was so. 12 The earth brought forth vegetation, plants yielding seed according to their own kinds, and trees bearing fruit in which is their seed, each according to its kind. And God saw that it was good.- Gen. 1:11-12
So God created the great sea creatures and every living creature that moves, with which the waters swarm, according to their kinds, and every winged bird according to its kind. And God saw that it was good.- Gen. 1:21
24 And God said, "Let the earth bring forth living creatures according to their kinds---livestock and creeping things and beasts of the earth according to their kinds." And it was so.25 And God made the beasts of the earth according to their kinds and the livestock according to their kinds, and everything that creeps on the ground according to its kind. And God saw that it was good.- Gen. 1:24-25
Notice the Old Testament phrase "sons of the prophets" (e.g. 1 Kings 20:35; 2 Kings 2:3, 5, 7, 15; 4:1, 38; 5:22; 6:1; 9:1). It meant that such persons were considered to be prophets themselves. To be called a "son of man" in the Old Testament meant to be a man (i.e. a human being). Only after the revelation of Dan. 7:13ff. did the term "son of man" take on a new secondary eschatological meaning (as I explained in the comments of ANOTHER BLOGPOST where "Son of Man" applied to Christ actually implies Christ's full divinity).
It might be pointed out that the Old Testament also makes statements that contradict the above point. For example, it is true that in the Old Testament angels in general (or a specific loftier species of angels) are called "sons of God" without them being the actual sons and offspring of God by nature (i.e. possessing the same nature as Almighty God). It is also true that Israelite kings are sometimes called the sons of God. Even Luke refers to Adam as a son of God (Luke 3:38). However, it was an understood given that neither angels nor humans are sons of God by nature. But this is unlike many of the descriptions of Jesus in the New Testament. Not in every context, but in many contexts the New Testament over and over and repeatedly implies the true sonship of Christ. That when "sonship" is connected with Christ it is because Jesus is the true offspring of God the Father.
This is why the Jews were often offended by Christ's claim to be God's Son. This is also why many translations capitalize the word "son" as "Son" in reference to Christ. Because the translators understand that Jesus is the "son of God" in an unique and special way like no other. Notice how the Jews interpreted Jesus' claim to being God's Son as blasphemy.
This was why the Jews were seeking all the more to kill him, because not only was he breaking the Sabbath, but he was even calling God his own Father, making himself equal with God.- John 5:18In this passage the Jews interpreted Jesus' teaching that He was the Son of God and that God was His Father as blasphemy because it was equivalent to "making himself equal with God." Thus showing how genuine sonship/progeny implied possessing the same nature as the parent. It is argued by non-Trinitarians that this passage cannot be teaching Jesus' equality with the Father because the Jews also thought Jesus broke the sabbath. They argue that either both are true or both are false. Since Jesus could not have broken the Sabbath, therefore Jesus couldn't be equal with God. However, Jesus could have "broken" the Sabbath not by violating it, but by superseding it precisely because Jesus is God. Jesus said He was able to perform miracles on the Sabbath because His Father was working on the Sabbath. "My Father is working until now, and I am working" (John 5:17). Jesus was saying that as the Son of God, He like the Father was able to work on (and so "break") the Sabbath. So, rather than disproving Christ's divinity, this actually supports it. This ability of Jesus to supersede some Old Testament ceremonial laws is also why Jesus remained ritually pure even though the unclean woman with the issue of blood touched Him (Mark 5:25ff.). Also why Jesus could touch a leper (Mark 1:40ff.) and remain ritually clean. Moreover, Jesus appealed to how the Law has different priorities so that some laws take precedence over others (like the command to circumcise on the 8th day even if it is on the Sabbath; John 7:21-24) and how there are "weightier matters of the law" (Matt. 23:23).
I address John 5:18 in fuller depth in another blogpost:
Jesus' "Breaking" the Sabbath as Evidence of His Equality with the Father
60 And the high priest stood up in the midst and asked Jesus, "Have you no answer to make? What is it that these men testify against you?"61 But he remained silent and made no answer. Again the high priest asked him, "Are you the Christ, the Son of the Blessed?"62 And Jesus said, "I am, and you will see the Son of Man seated at the right hand of Power, and coming with the clouds of heaven."63 And the high priest tore his garments and said, "What further witnesses do we need?64 You have heard his blasphemy. What is your decision?" And they all condemned him as deserving death.- Mark 14:60-64
62 And the high priest stood up and said, "Have you no answer to make? What is it that these men testify against you?"63 But Jesus remained silent. And the high priest said to him, "I adjure you by the living God, tell us if you are the Christ, the Son of God."64 Jesus said to him, "You have said so. But I tell you, from now on you will see the Son of Man seated at the right hand of Power and coming on the clouds of heaven."65 Then the high priest tore his robes and said, "He has uttered blasphemy. What further witnesses do we need? You have now heard his blasphemy.66 What is your judgment?" They answered, "He deserves death."- Matt. 26:62-66
67 "If you are the Christ, tell us." But he said to them, "If I tell you, you will not believe,68 and if I ask you, you will not answer.69 But from now on the Son of Man shall be seated at the right hand of the power of God."70 So they all said, "Are you the Son of God, then?" And he said to them, "You say that I am."71 Then they said, "What further testimony do we need? We have heard it ourselves from his own lips."- Luke 22:67-71
29 My Father, who has given them to me, is greater than all, and no one is able to snatch them out of the Father's hand.30 I and the Father are one."
31 The Jews picked up stones again to stone him.32 Jesus answered them, "I have shown you many good works from the Father; for which of them are you going to stone me?"33 The Jews answered him, "It is not for a good work that we are going to stone you but for blasphemy, because you, being a man, make yourself God."- John 10:29-33 [ Admittedly, some non-Trinitarians interpret this passage and the following verses in the opposite direction of Trinitarianism. See my blogpost titled: God, gods and Jesus in John 10:30-39]
This is also why the author of the book of Hebrews goes out of his way to distinguish Jesus from the angels and to deny Jesus' being an angel. Notice the CONTRASTS being made by the author when he compares the Sonship of Christ with the nature or status of angels.
4 having become as much superior to angels as the name he has inherited is more excellent than theirs.
5 For to which of the angels did God ever say,
"You are my Son,
today I have begotten you"?
Or again,
"I will be to him a father,
and he shall be to me a son"?
6 And again, when he brings the firstborn into the world, he says,
"Let all God's angels worship him."
7 Of the angels he says,
"He makes his angels winds,
and his ministers a flame of fire."
8 But of the Son he says,
"Your throne, O God, is forever and ever,
the scepter of uprightness is the scepter of your kingdom.- Heb. 1:4-8
13 And to which of the angels has he ever said,Clearly, the author wants to contrast Jesus to the angels, and so deny that Jesus is an angel. The author DOES NOT say to which of the "other angels..." Nor does the author say, let "most of God's angels worship Him." It says, "Let all God's angels worship him." Therefore, Jesus cannot be an incarnate angel.
"Sit at my right hand
until I make your enemies a footstool for your feet"?
14 Are they not all ministering spirits sent out to serve for the sake of those who are to inherit salvation?- Heb. 1:13-14
I could discuss the places in the New Testament where Jesus is referred to as "the only begotten" to argue for Christ being the true offspring of God the Father. However, the meaning of the underlying Greek word "monogenes" is disputed by Greek scholars. Some interpret it to mean something like "only" or "unique" rather than the traditional understanding of "only begotten." Nevertheless, what I've written so far in this blogpost should be enough to demonstrate, at the very least, that Jesus is God's Son in a unique way.
But is Jesus really and truly Almighty God's offspring? If so, wouldn't that actually undermine the doctrine of the Trinity and the full deity of Christ? This is the conclusion of many non-Trinitarians. They argue that in human experience offspring have existence in a point in time after the existence of their parents. Therefore, (as Arius of old inferred) there was a time when Christ was not (i.e. didn't exist). By this point in this blogpost's exploration of the nature of God and of Christ we necessarily must deal with various options and alternatives. Where we have to admit (even if not explore) the distinctions between Arianism, Semi-Arianism, Nicene Monarchism and the various Trinitarian positions. Also, issues regarding the eternal generation or filiation of the Son, and the eternal procession or spiration of the Holy Spirit, the nature of the incarnation et cetera and whether such concepts are true.
For myself, I'm convinced of some sort of Trinitarianism or possibly Nicene Monarchism. There are various (sometimes conflicting) ways Trinitarians explain the doctrine of the Trinity. Some are more appealing to me than others.
As I continue studying the early church on the Christological controversies I've found many of the comments by (non-Trinitarian) David Waltz informative. He holds to what he has termed Nicene Monarchism and I find it appealing. Though, for the meantime I remain a Trinitarian. I do so while admitting the open secret that there are various types of Trinitarianisms (even among Evangelicals).
As David Waltz put it:
Now, when we look at “the” Evangelical doctrine of the Trinty, one is forced to conclude that it is “doctrines”, not “the doctrine”, for the following are but a few examples of the different forms of Trinitarianism held within Evangelicalism. 1.) The Son and the Spirit are generated from the Father’s essence, who is the source, fountain-head of the Trinity (Melanchthon, Jonathan Edwards). 2.) It is the person alone, not the essence which is generated from the Father (John Calvin, Francis Turrettin, and most Reformed theologians). 3.) There is no generation of persons within the Godhead; the Logos became the Son at the incarnation (Oliver Buswell, Walter Martin, early writings of John MacArthur). 4.) The Godhead is one person, and within the being of this one person there are three personal subsistences (Cornelius Van Til). 5.) The Trinity is not composed of persons in the modern sense (i.e. three distinct centers of conscious personal beings), but rather of three modes of existence (Donald Bloesch). 6.) Social Trinitarianism (Cornelius Plantinga, Jr., Millard Erickson, Edward Wierenga).I don't take a dogmatic stand on any one Trinitarian view. However, I find #2 (maybe in conjunction with #4) attractive. It's the default position I defend and tentatively/provisionally hold to for the sake of argument and because it seems better in 1. affirming the unity of God, 2. affirming the plurality of God, 3. affirming the full deity of the Son and Holy Spirit, 4. preserving the genuine and eternal generation/filiation of the Son and the procession/spiration of the Holy Spirit.
I argued for Option #2 in another blogpost. It was Argument Two at that blogpost. I've reproduced the argument below.
Argument Two
- Some Trinitarians like Jonathan Edwards have argued that God's eternal self-knowledge is so clear, so intense, so glorious and infinite that His mental self-conception or idea of Himself literally conceives, eternally, the person of the Son. Analogously, as a mirror reflects the one standing in front of it, so God's mental self-reflection eternally begets a second divine person, viz. the Son of God. Might it be that God's self-imagination is the Son who Scripture repeatedly states is the image of the invisible God? Furthermore, the love between the Father and the Son, the two divine persons, is itself so intense, so glorious and infinite that that love also eternally produces a third divine person, namely the Holy Spirit. And so, we have here a possible explanation of the eternal generation (or filiation) of the Son, along with the eternal procession (or spiration) of the Holy Spirit as historically understood by Trinitarians. And one that especially makes sense if the filioque clause is factored in. Since the Holy Spirit would proceed from the Father and the Son or the Father through the Son. This explanation would entail that each person of the Trinity is eternal (since the Father never began to have self-knowledge nor ever began to love that self-knowledge), while at the same time explain how the person of the Son is dependent on the person of the Father for His existence, along with the Holy Spirit depending on the Father and the Son for His existence (as the New Testament seems to imply). Yet, all three persons would be truly and fully God without subordination of ontology, even if there might be functional/complementarian subordination among the persons.
This argument is essentially that of Jonathan Edwards in his, An Unpublished Essay on the Trinity. Jonathan Edwards' argument may be an adaptation and modification of traditional arguments he inherited from the past history of Christian theology and philosophy (e.g. from Thomas Aquinas).
As an avid follower of Edwards, John Piper argues this in the first chapter of his book The Pleasures of God: Meditations on God's Delight in Being God. I believe (rightly or wrongly) that that first chapter has been posted online HERE.
Piper also explored this idea in a sermon he gave years before the publication of his book. The sermon is, The Pleasure of God In His Son (preached Jan. 25, 1987).
Piper states it this way in his sermon:
We are on the brink of the ineffable here, but perhaps we may dare to say this much: as long as God has been God, he has been conscious of himself, and the image that he has of himself is so perfect and so complete and full as to be the living, personal reproduction (or begetting) of himself. And this living, personal image or reflection or form of God is God, namely, God the Son. And therefore God the Son is co-eternal with God the Father and equal in essence and glory.
Thomas Aquinas argues similarly (though not exactly) in his Summa Theologica, Part 1, Treatise on The Most Holy Trinity, Question 27 (or look it up Here)
Consider what Tertullian wrote:
And that you may the more readily understand this, consider first of all, from your own self, who are made “in the image and likeness of God,” for what purpose it is that you also possess reason in yourself, who are a rational creature, as being not only made by a rational Artificer, but actually animated out of His substance. Observe, then, that when you are silently conversing with yourself, this very process is carried on within you by your reason, which meets you with a word at every movement of your thought, at every impulse of your conception. Whatever you think, there is a word; whatever you conceive, there is reason. You must needs speak it in your mind; and while you are speaking, you admit speech as an interlocutor with you, involved in which there is this very reason, whereby, while in thought you are holding converse with your word, you are (by reciprocal action) producing thought by means of that converse with your word. Thus, in a certain sense, the word is a second person within you, through which in thinking you utter speech, and through which also, (by reciprocity of process,) in uttering speech you generate thought. The word is itself a different thing from yourself. Now how much more fully is all this transacted in God, whose image and likeness even you are regarded as being, inasmuch as He has reason within Himself even while He is silent, and involved in that Reason His Word! I may therefore without rashness first lay this down (as a fixed principle) that even then before the creation of the universe God was not alone, since He had within Himself both Reason, and, inherent in Reason, His Word, which He made second to Himself by agitating it within Himself. - Tertullian in Against Praxeas [trans. by Dr. Holmes]
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf03.v.ix.v.html
The two arguments above (#1 & #2) [referring to the other blogpost from which I've copied and pasted this. So, argument #1 isn't in this blogpost] could be seen as contradictory. Since, the first argument implies that a divine person can't exist apart from at least one other divine person. The second argument implies that the others (i.e. Son and Spirit) can't exist apart from the Father.
That's why I wrote, "If one doesn't like that argument, here's another...." Nevertheless, I don't think they are necessarily contradictory. Also, they are two different types of arguments. The first part of Argument One is a hypothetical thought experiment. The second part is pure speculation. As a whole, the first argument is an argument based on natural theology. That is, on what can be gleaned and inferred from general revelation using reason. While Argument Two attempts to explain Trinitarian theology by freely using Biblical data and so appeals to and depends on special revelation. The first argument moves from the many to the one. The second argument moves from the one to the many.
Here's a link to J.C. Philpot's classic work: The True, Proper, and Eternal Sonship of the Lord Jesus Christ The Only Begotten Son of God
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