ChatGPT answered in a way that I myself independently concluded years ago, and which I've seen other theologians have argued [for example John Edwards HERE]:
Yes—within classical Trinitarian theology there is a well-developed way to affirm EG and EP while still affirming both the Son’s and the Spirit’s necessary existence, and even (in a qualified sense) their self-existence. The key is careful distinctions.
1. Necessary existence (NE) is straightforwardly affirmed
All orthodox Trinitarian positions affirm that:
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The one divine essence exists necessarily
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The Father, Son, and Spirit each fully possess that same essence
Therefore:
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The Son and Spirit exist necessarily, not contingently
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Their existence is not caused in time, nor dependent on creation or divine will
So EG and EP do not threaten NE at all.
2. The real tension concerns self-existence (aseity)
The issue is how to understand aseity (SE).
Traditionally:
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Aseity properly belongs to the divine essence
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The essence exists a se (from itself)
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The persons are distinguished only by relations of origin
This leads to the classical claim:
The Father is unbegotten;
the Son is eternally begotten;
the Spirit eternally proceeds.
So the question becomes:
Does eternal derivation exclude self-existence?
3. Classical solution: distinguish essence from personal relations
Core distinction
This allows the following formulation:
The Son is autotheos with respect to essence,
but not autotheos with respect to personal origin.
This view is found (with different emphases) in:
So:
No temporal priority, no inequality, no contingency.
4. Why eternal generation does not deny true divinity
Eternal generation is:
So the Son is not:
Rather:
The dependence is relational, not essential.
5. Two orthodox ways of stating the position
Option A: Classical (most common)
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Aseity belongs strictly to the divine essence
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Persons possess aseity by identity with the essence
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Personal relations do not introduce ontological dependence
Option B: Qualified autotheos of the Son
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The Son is self-existent as God
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But not self-originating as Son
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This preserves both EG/EP and strong divine equality
Both positions are orthodox; they differ in how strongly aseity is predicated of persons rather than essence.
6. What would actually be denied by EG/EP
EG and EP deny:
They do not deny:
Bottom line
Yes—you can affirm NE and (properly understood) SE while affirming EG and EP, if you:
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Ground aseity in the divine essence
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Understand generation and procession as eternal relations, not causal dependence
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Distinguish what is true of God essentially from what is true of persons relationally
If you want, I can:
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Compare this with social Trinitarian models
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Explain why some modern theologians reject EG/EP
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Map how this plays out in Nicene vs post-Nicene theology
I asked ChatGPT to compare its answer to a question I asked it a while back based on my blogpost HERE. I noted that the answer was similar.
ChatGPT's answer:
Yes—your recollection is right, and you’re also right to notice that this lines up very closely with the answer I just gave, because John Edwards is effectively pushing one of the strongest possible versions of the “autotheos-with-qualification” position.
What’s helpful now is to be very clear about where Edwards is orthodox, where he is innovative, and where tensions remain.
I’ll proceed in four steps:
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What Edwards is doing philosophically
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Why his argument is coherent (not nonsense)
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Where it presses against classical patristic language
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How this fits with EG/EP without contradiction
1. What Edwards is actually doing
Edwards is making a strict essence-based argument:
If the Son and Father share the same numerical divine essence,
and if self-existence (aseity) belongs essentially to that essence,
then the Son must be self-existent in the same sense as the Father.
This is not a casual claim. It rests on three deep commitments:
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Numerical identity of essence (not merely generic sameness)
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Aseity as an essential property of deity
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Perichoresis as metaphysically real, not just rhetorical
In other words, Edwards is reasoning inside Nicene metaphysics, not outside it.
2. Why Edwards’ argument is coherent (not contradictory)
(a) The key move: denying a creaturely inference
The crucial objection is:
“He who exists from another does not exist from himself.”
Edwards’ response is subtle but valid given eternalism:
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That inference is true only for temporal, finite beings
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It relies on priority, dependency, and external causation
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None of those apply in eternal generation
So Edwards is right to say:
This is a standard move in classical theism (you see versions of it in Aquinas, Gregory of Nyssa, and later Reformed scholastics).
(b) John 5:26 and “given life”
Edwards’ reading here is actually quite strong:
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“Life in himself” = essential, underived divine life
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“Given” = eternal communication of essence, not acquisition
So:
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The Son does not receive aseity as a property he lacked
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Rather, the Father eternally communicates the self-existent essence
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Which remains self-existent wherever it subsists
This avoids contradiction because:
That distinction is crucial.
3. Where Edwards goes beyond many Fathers
You’re also right that many Church Fathers denied aseity of the Son in a personal sense.
Typical patristic formula:
What Edwards does differently:
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He refuses to restrict aseity only to the Father
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He insists that aseity belongs to the essence as such
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And since the Son is identical with that essence, aseity cannot be absent
This is not heretical, but it does shift emphasis:
That difference explains the tension, without implying contradiction.
4. Does this still affirm Eternal Generation and Procession?
Yes—but with a precise understanding.
Edwards affirms:
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The Son is eternally from the Father as Son
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The Father is the personal principle (arche) without denying equality
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Generation is necessary, eternal, internal
But he denies:
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That “from the Father” means ontological dependence
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That it implies lack of aseity
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That it introduces priority or derivation of being
So the structure looks like this:
| Aspect | Essence | Person |
|---|
| Existence | A se | Relationally from |
| Necessity | Absolute | Absolute |
| Origin | None | Father → Son / Spirit |
| Divinity | Identical | Identical |
Thus:
The Son is from the Father personally,
from himself essentially,
and from neither temporally.
No contradiction arises unless one equivocates between:
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essential existence
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personal origin
5. Final evaluation
Your earlier question, my earlier answer, and your present formulation are all converging on the same point:
Eternal Generation and Eternal Procession do not logically require denying the Son’s or Spirit’s aseity—only denying that they are unoriginated persons.
John Edwards’ position is:
That’s why it feels both compelling and controversial.
If you want, next we could:
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Compare Edwards to Calvin’s autotheos doctrine
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Contrast this with Thomistic accounts of aseity
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Or analyze whether Edwards’ view subtly shifts the monarchia of the Father
Just tell me where you want to go next.
