Saturday, January 3, 2026

Can the Son and Spirit Be "Self-Existent" Given the Doctrines of Eternal Generation and Eternal Procession?

 

I asked the following question of ChatGPT:

The Trinitarian doctrines of the Eternal Generation [EG] of the Son and the Eternal Procession [EP] of the Holy Spirit seems to me can still affirm the necessary existence [NE] of both the Son and Spirit, but implies a denial of their self-existence [SE]. Is there a way to affirm both while affirming EG and EP?


ChatGPT answered in a way that I myself independently concluded years ago, and which I've seen other theologians have argued [for example John Edwards HERE]:

ChatGPT's Answer:

Yes—within classical Trinitarian theology there is a well-developed way to affirm EG and EP while still affirming both the Son’s and the Spirit’s necessary existence, and even (in a qualified sense) their self-existence. The key is careful distinctions.


1. Necessary existence (NE) is straightforwardly affirmed

All orthodox Trinitarian positions affirm that:

  • The one divine essence exists necessarily

  • The Father, Son, and Spirit each fully possess that same essence

Therefore:

  • The Son and Spirit exist necessarily, not contingently

  • Their existence is not caused in time, nor dependent on creation or divine will

So EG and EP do not threaten NE at all.


2. The real tension concerns self-existence (aseity)

The issue is how to understand aseity (SE).

Traditionally:

  • Aseity properly belongs to the divine essence

  • The essence exists a se (from itself)

  • The persons are distinguished only by relations of origin

This leads to the classical claim:

The Father is unbegotten;
the Son is eternally begotten;
the Spirit eternally proceeds.

So the question becomes:
Does eternal derivation exclude self-existence?


3. Classical solution: distinguish essence from personal relations

Core distinction

  • As God (according to essence):

    • The Son and Spirit are self-existent

  • As persons (according to relation of origin):

    • The Son is from the Father

    • The Spirit is from the Father (and the Son, in the West)

This allows the following formulation:

The Son is autotheos with respect to essence,
but not autotheos with respect to personal origin.

This view is found (with different emphases) in:

  • Athanasius

  • The Cappadocians

  • Augustine

  • Aquinas

  • Calvin (explicitly uses autotheos language)

So:

  • No person causes the divine essence

  • But the Father communicates the one divine essence to the Son and Spirit eternally

No temporal priority, no inequality, no contingency.


4. Why eternal generation does not deny true divinity

Eternal generation is:

  • Necessary, not free

  • Internal to God

  • Ontological, not efficient-causal in a creaturely sense

So the Son is not:

  • Dependent like a creature

  • Less divine

  • Derivative in being God

Rather:

  • The Son’s mode of being God is from the Father

  • The Father’s mode of being God is unbegotten

The dependence is relational, not essential.


5. Two orthodox ways of stating the position

Option A: Classical (most common)

  • Aseity belongs strictly to the divine essence

  • Persons possess aseity by identity with the essence

  • Personal relations do not introduce ontological dependence

Option B: Qualified autotheos of the Son

  • The Son is self-existent as God

  • But not self-originating as Son

  • This preserves both EG/EP and strong divine equality

Both positions are orthodox; they differ in how strongly aseity is predicated of persons rather than essence.


6. What would actually be denied by EG/EP

EG and EP deny:

  • That the Son and Spirit are unoriginated persons

  • That they are independent centers of deity

They do not deny:

  • Necessary existence

  • Full divinity

  • Co-equality

  • Co-eternity

  • Possession of aseity as God


Bottom line

Yes—you can affirm NE and (properly understood) SE while affirming EG and EP, if you:

  1. Ground aseity in the divine essence

  2. Understand generation and procession as eternal relations, not causal dependence

  3. Distinguish what is true of God essentially from what is true of persons relationally

If you want, I can:

  • Compare this with social Trinitarian models

  • Explain why some modern theologians reject EG/EP

  • Map how this plays out in Nicene vs post-Nicene theology


I asked ChatGPT to compare its answer to a question I asked it a while back based on my blogpost HERE. I noted that the answer was similar. 



ChatGPT's answer:

Yes—your recollection is right, and you’re also right to notice that this lines up very closely with the answer I just gave, because John Edwards is effectively pushing one of the strongest possible versions of the “autotheos-with-qualification” position.

What’s helpful now is to be very clear about where Edwards is orthodox, where he is innovative, and where tensions remain.

I’ll proceed in four steps:

  1. What Edwards is doing philosophically

  2. Why his argument is coherent (not nonsense)

  3. Where it presses against classical patristic language

  4. How this fits with EG/EP without contradiction


1. What Edwards is actually doing

Edwards is making a strict essence-based argument:

If the Son and Father share the same numerical divine essence,
and if self-existence (aseity) belongs essentially to that essence,
then the Son must be self-existent in the same sense as the Father.

This is not a casual claim. It rests on three deep commitments:

  • Numerical identity of essence (not merely generic sameness)

  • Aseity as an essential property of deity

  • Perichoresis as metaphysically real, not just rhetorical

In other words, Edwards is reasoning inside Nicene metaphysics, not outside it.


2. Why Edwards’ argument is coherent (not contradictory)

(a) The key move: denying a creaturely inference

The crucial objection is:

“He who exists from another does not exist from himself.”

Edwards’ response is subtle but valid given eternalism:

  • That inference is true only for temporal, finite beings

  • It relies on priority, dependency, and external causation

  • None of those apply in eternal generation

So Edwards is right to say:

  • You cannot import creaturely causation logic into eternal divine relations

  • Doing so collapses the Creator–creature distinction

This is a standard move in classical theism (you see versions of it in Aquinas, Gregory of Nyssa, and later Reformed scholastics).


(b) John 5:26 and “given life”

Edwards’ reading here is actually quite strong:

  • “Life in himself” = essential, underived divine life

  • “Given” = eternal communication of essence, not acquisition

So:

  • The Son does not receive aseity as a property he lacked

  • Rather, the Father eternally communicates the self-existent essence

  • Which remains self-existent wherever it subsists

This avoids contradiction because:

  • The property is not caused

  • Only the personal mode of subsistence is relational

That distinction is crucial.


3. Where Edwards goes beyond many Fathers

You’re also right that many Church Fathers denied aseity of the Son in a personal sense.

Typical patristic formula:

  • Father: unbegotten, a se

  • Son: begotten, from the Father

  • Spirit: proceeding

What Edwards does differently:

  • He refuses to restrict aseity only to the Father

  • He insists that aseity belongs to the essence as such

  • And since the Son is identical with that essence, aseity cannot be absent

This is not heretical, but it does shift emphasis:

  • Fathers often spoke person-first

  • Edwards speaks essence-first

That difference explains the tension, without implying contradiction.


4. Does this still affirm Eternal Generation and Procession?

Yes—but with a precise understanding.

Edwards affirms:

  • The Son is eternally from the Father as Son

  • The Father is the personal principle (arche) without denying equality

  • Generation is necessary, eternal, internal

But he denies:

  • That “from the Father” means ontological dependence

  • That it implies lack of aseity

  • That it introduces priority or derivation of being

So the structure looks like this:

AspectEssencePerson
ExistenceA seRelationally from
NecessityAbsoluteAbsolute
OriginNoneFather → Son / Spirit
DivinityIdenticalIdentical

Thus:

The Son is from the Father personally,
from himself essentially,
and from neither temporally.

No contradiction arises unless one equivocates between:

  • essential existence

  • personal origin


5. Final evaluation

Your earlier question, my earlier answer, and your present formulation are all converging on the same point:

Eternal Generation and Eternal Procession do not logically require denying the Son’s or Spirit’s aseity—only denying that they are unoriginated persons.

John Edwards’ position is:

  • Metaphysically coherent

  • Textually motivated

  • Within the bounds of Nicene orthodoxy

  • But not the dominant patristic idiom

That’s why it feels both compelling and controversial.

If you want, next we could:

  • Compare Edwards to Calvin’s autotheos doctrine

  • Contrast this with Thomistic accounts of aseity

  • Or analyze whether Edwards’ view subtly shifts the monarchia of the Father

Just tell me where you want to go next.



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